“The votes, vetoes and political economy of international trade agreements . . . is the most comprehensive modern treatment of the national political economy for trade agreements. For economists, political scientists and political analysts interested in trade agreements and the development of the international trading system, this is essential. — Pravin Krishna, Journal of Economic Literature”[T] is a great book, one of the most provocative written on this subject. . . . No one who is interested in the political economy of trade can ignore this book. Undoubtedly, it will be widely read and quoted as it deserved to be. — Kerry A. Chase, Review of International Organizations Please list all fees and grants from, employment, advice for shared ownership or a close relationship, at any time in the past 36 months, any organization whose interests may be affected by the publication of the response. Please also list all non-financial associations or interests (personal, professional, political, institutional, religious or other) that a reasonable reader wishes to know about the work submitted.

This applies to all the authors of the play, their spouses or partners. “The theme of this book is of paramount importance to students and researchers in international relations, international economics and international law. Mansfield and Milner use a clear view of research to convincingly show that democratic countries are more likely to sign preferential trade agreements, but that the likelihood of such agreements diminishing increases with the number of veto players. ” -Mark S. Manger, author of investing in protection: The Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements between North and South Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) play an increasingly important role in the global political economy, two outstanding examples are the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. These agreements promote economic integration between Member States by improving their access to each other`s markets. However, despite the importance of ATPs to international and global policy, little attention has been paid to why governments choose to join them and how governments organize them. This book offers valuable new insights into the political economy of education in THE EPZ. Many economists have argued that the roots of these agreements lie in the promise they believe to improve the well-being of Member States. Others said trade agreements were a response to global political conditions. Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner argue that domestic policy gives decisive impetus to governments` decision to enter into trade pacts.

On the basis of this argument, they explain why democracies adhere to PTAs rather than undemocratic regimes and why the likelihood of the state entering a trade agreement decreases when the number of veto powers – interest groups with the power to block political change – increases in a future Member State. The book provides a new overview of the political underpinnings of trade agreements. “Preferential trade agreements are an increasingly important part of the global political economy, but our understanding of their consequences goes far beyond our knowledge of their origin. Mansfield and Milner are doing a lot to rectify this situation. By combining extensive theorizing and in-depth data collection and in-depth analysis, they provide a profound insight into how, when and why democratic policies conclude international trade agreements. David Leblang, University of Virginia, co-author of Democratic Processes and Financial Markets” This beautiful book by two leading political scientists provides an edifying insight into preferred trade agreements. This book is an important contribution to our understanding of these trade agreements, and economists and political scientists will benefit from reading it. – Douglas Irwin, Dartmouth College.